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INTRODUCTION

On January 20, 2021, President Joseph Biden took the Oath of Office
and began undertaking his climate change plan, The Biden Plan for a
Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice (The Biden
Plan). 1 While President Biden’s agenda will benefit from a Democratic
government trifecta with slim majorities in the House and Senate, it still
faces challenges of continued congressional partisanship; substantial
rollbacks in environmental policy from former President Trump’s
administration; and ongoing pushback by the fossil fuel industry. 2
Inside President Biden’s administration, the current rate of
policymaking to address climate change is not rapid enough to meet
President Biden’s benchmark of 100% clean energy by 2050. 3
*

1.

2.

3.

J.D. Candidate, May 2022, University of Baltimore School of Law, B.A.,
Communication, 2015, The George Washington University. Thank you to Professor
Sonya Ziaja, whose zeal for environmental law and constructive feedback is always
very much appreciated. I also want to thank my wonderful parents and friends for being
my cheerleaders throughout law school. I am grateful to the University of Baltimore
Law Review for their commitment to showcasing excellent work. This Comment
reflects my belief in the Jewish principle of pikuach nefesh, which tells us that
preserving human life and health takes precedence over all other laws.
The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice, JOE BIDEN
FOR PRESIDENT [hereinafter The Biden Plan], https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/
[https://perma.cc/RNY2-XFE8] (last visited July 30, 2021); see also Jean Chemnick,
Here Are All the Climate Actions Biden Took on Day One, SCI. AM. (Jan. 21, 2021),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/here-are-all-the-climate-actions-bidentook-on-day-one/ [https://perma.cc/WV26-FYBE].
See EPA Watch: Serving as a Watchdog to Protect the Environment, ENV’T INTEGRITY
PROJECT,
https://environmentalintegrity.org/trump-watch-epa/regulatory-rollbacks/
[https://perma.cc/7FJ6-TRV2] (last visited July 30, 2021); see also Emma Newburger,
Biden’s Climate Change Agenda Will Face Big Obstacles with Evenly Divided Senate,
CNBC (Jan. 30, 2021, 9:30 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/30/bidens-climatechange-agenda-to-face-obstacles-with-senate-.html
[https://perma.cc/4XL2-C82X]
(“The Biden administration has a slim Democratic Senate majority that’s 10 votes short
of the 60 needed to break the Senate’s filibuster and pass climate bills.”); Jim
Tankersley & Michael D. Shear, With Democrats in Control, Biden Moves to Advance
Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/07/business/democrats-bidenagenda.html [https://perma.cc/BLW2-FPSE] (Jan. 20, 2021) (“In the House, Democrats
will have only a 12-seat advantage, potentially dampening the multi-trillion-dollar
ambitions that Mr. Biden laid out in the 2020 campaign to expand health care, reduce
economic inequality and combat climate change . . . .”).
See Elinor Aspegren, Wind Energy Had a ‘Banner Year’ in 2020. Here’s What That
Means for Joe Biden’s Climate Plan, USA TODAY (Feb. 12, 2021, 12:38 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2021/02/11/wind-energy-joe-bidenclimate-plan-texas-wyoming/6715555002/ [https://perma.cc/X47G-BBP8] (“Despite
the wind energy industry’s gains in 2020, the U.S. remains far from carbon neutrality .
. . a main goal in the Biden administration’s climate plan.”); The Biden Plan, supra note
1 (“As President, Biden will lead the world to address the climate emergency . . . by
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Externally, political and corporate influences threaten to continue
stalling the urgent actions needed to address the climate crisis. 4 For
President Biden to achieve a 100% clean energy economy, he needs
more aggressive, more creative strategies to establish legislation and
institute long-term climate goals that will persist long beyond his time
in the White House. 5
This Comment argues that three federal land acquisitions strategies
offer President Biden legal means to execute his long-term renewable
energy goals by targeting properties currently being used for
nonrenewable energy production, but his administration must carefully
weigh the desirable expedience of these approaches with their
respective social, political, and economic costs. Part II of this
Comment provides an overview on The Biden Plan and three possible
approaches to federal acquisition of nonrenewable fossil fuel facilities:
(A) a government buyback approach; 6 (B) a federal regulatory takings
approach; 7 and (C) a federal eminent domain approach. 8 Part III
reviews the actions that President Biden has taken toward his energy
and climate goals since the start of his term. 9 Part IV discusses the
viability of utilizing each proposed approach for federal land
acquisitions to further his administration’s goals. 10 Part V concludes
and provides recommendations to urge President Biden’s development
of an acquisitions strategy through the three outlined approaches. 11

4.

5.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

ensuring the U.S. achieves a 100% clean energy economy and net-zero emissions no
later than 2050.”).
See The Biden Plan, supra note 1; Coral Davenport & Lisa Friedman, The Battle Lines
Are Forming in Biden’s Climate Push, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/26/climate/biden-climate-change.html
[https://perma.cc/SZ5U-X6KX].
See The Biden Plan, supra note 1. President Biden uses the term “clean energy” in
reference to renewable, “low- and zero-carbon technologies,” including lithium-ion
batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, and potentially nuclear power. Id.; see also
Newburger, supra note 2 (“Without new climate legislation from Congress, Biden’s
orders to reverse Trump’s rollbacks on emissions from vehicles, power plants and oil
and gas drilling could be easily undone by a future administration.”); Miranda Green,
Activists Fear Biden’s Climate Pledges Are Falling Apart: ‘We Aren’t Seeing Grit’,
THE GUARDIAN (June 22, 2021, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2021/jun/22/biden-climate-change-plan-environment [https://perma.cc/Y6E8-CZ3E].
See discussion infra Sections IV.A.1, IV.A.2.
See discussion infra Sections IV.B.1, IV.B.2.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE BIDEN PLAN AND THREE FEDERAL
LAND ACQUISITIONS APPROACHES
A. The Biden Plan
The Biden Plan is a detailed blueprint for clean energy and climate
policy, divided into five overarching goals: (1) transition the U.S. to a
100% clean energy economy with net-zero emissions by 2050; (2)
invest in land, water, transportation, and energy infrastructure to adapt
and mitigate climate impacts; (3) lead the global response to climate
change and rejoin the Paris Agreement; (4) assist vulnerable
communities that are disproportionately impacted by climate change
and for-profit polluters; and (5) ensure that industrial workers and
communities are not left behind. 12 The Biden Plan sets forth many
intended outcomes, but its overarching objectives are to achieve a
100% clean energy economy and, in turn, improve quality of life for all,
with a particular focus on marginalized and poor communities who are
impacted most by environmentally degradative energy infrastructure
across the nation. 13 President Biden’s emphasis on clean energy
derives from clear projections that fossil fuel consumption creates
climate change: the U.S. Energy Information Administration and the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimate that the
burning of petroleum, natural gas, and coal is responsible for between
ninety-seven and ninety-nine percent of all U.S. energy-related carbon
emissions. 14 CO2 emissions accelerate climate change, and the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change projects global
temperature increases in excess of 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052 due

12.
13.

14.

See The Biden Plan, supra note 1; Chemnick, supra note 1 (explaining that President
Biden initiated U.S. reentry to the Paris Agreement on his first day in office).
See The Biden Plan, supra note 1 (“[E]nvironmental burdens and benefits have been
and will continue to be distributed unevenly along racial and socioeconomic lines – not
just with respect to climate change, but also pollution of our air, water, and land.”);
Patricia Romero-Lankao et al., Part B: Chapter 26: North America, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTION, AND VULNERABILITY: WORKING GROUP II
CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1439, 1471 (Vincente R. Barros et al. eds., 2014); Alice Kaswan,
Domestic Climate Change Adaption and Equity, 42 ENV'T L. REP. 11125, 11125–27
(2012).
Energy and the Environment Explained: Where Greenhouse Gases Come From, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-theenvironment/where-greenhouse-gases-come-from.php [https://perma.cc/P75N-ZM5G]
(May 21, 2021); see Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions
[https://perma.cc/8LA4-U4SA] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021).
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to anthropogenic climate impacts. 15 Carbon emissions have and will
continue to exacerbate climate impacts, including inundation, heat
waves, illness, and resource scarcity, especially for the populations
already most exposed to these effects. 16 Thus, federal adherence and
expansion to President Biden’s plan for eliminating carbon emissions
is critically important, and President Biden does not have the luxury of
spare time. 17 His actions on climate change and renewable energy
during his first term will, in no uncertain terms, impact how many
more lives are lost as a consequence of climate change. 18
B. Three Proposals for Federal Land Acquisition Programs
Since energy-related carbon emissions are a primary catalyst for
climate change and are President Biden’s primary concern in The
Biden Plan, he should seek a course of action that will allow for the
rapid diminishment of carbon consumption and the expansion of clean

15.

16.

17.

18.

Christopher B. Field et al., Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects, in CLIMATE CHANGE
2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY: WORKING GROUP II CONTRIBUTION
TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE 535, 554 (Christopher B. Field et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter IPCC 2014].
See id. at 6. The COVID-19 pandemic makes such impacts empirical: climate change
may be a risk factor for disease transmission and, in the U.S., the rates of COVID-19
transmission, hospitalization, and death are highest in Black and Hispanic or Latinx
communities. See William A. Calo et al., Reaching the Hispanic Community About
COVID-19 Through Existing Chronic Disease Prevention Programs, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 25, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/
2020/20_0165.htm [https://perma.cc/5RM3-P9K2]. The CDC’s statistics correlate
disease with socioeconomic status, which also affects access to resources like
healthcare. See Coronavirus, Climate Change, and the Environment: A Conversation
on COVID-19 with Dr. Aaron Bernstein, Director of Harvard Chan, HARV. T.H. CHAN.
SCH. PUB. HEALTH: C-CHANGE, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/c-change/subtopics/
coronavirus-and-climate-change [https://perma.cc/9BTR-D5V5] (last visited Oct. 2,
2021); Risk for COVID-19 Infection, Hospitalization, and Death by Race/Ethnicity,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/covid-data/investigations-discovery/hospitalization-death-by-race-ethnicity.html
[https://perma.cc/WL2P-F2LF] (Sept. 9, 2021).
See Kate Ramsayer, Emissions Could Add 15 Inches to Sea Level by 2100, NASA-Led
Study Finds, NASA (Sept. 17, 2020), https://climate.nasa.gov/news/3021/emissionscould-add-15-inches-to-sea-level-by-2100-nasa-led-study-finds/
[https://perma.cc/3FP7-7LBP].
See IPCC 2014, supra note 15, at 5 (describing “[t]he potential occurrence of a natural
or human-induced physical event or trend or physical impact that may cause loss of life,
injury, or other health impacts”); Oliver Milman, Biden’s Clean Energy Plan Would
Cut Emissions and Save 317,000 Lives, THE GUARDIAN (July 12, 2021, 12:01 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jul/11/biden-administration-cleanenergy-climate-crisis [https://perma.cc/P8HH-PM6S].
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energy before his 2050 benchmark. 19 Such action could be effectuated
through comprehensive acquisition of fossil fuel facilities, which
would then be transitioned into clean, renewable energy sources. 20
This Comment proposes three legal approaches that President Biden
may take to implement a federal acquisitions program. First, he could
initiate a national buyback of nonrenewable coal, oil, and gas energy
sites by using the federal budget to incentivize the fossil fuel industry
into a clean energy transition. 21 Second, President Biden may utilize
regulatory takings, where polluting land uses like coal and oil refining
are effectively “taken” when federal laws, like those promulgated at
EPA, phase the uses out of existence. 22 Under this approach, the
federal government would not physically acquire properties. Instead,
the properties would become available through policies designed to
scale down fossil fuel procurement. 23 Third, federal eminent domain
powers may allow the federal government to reduce, and ultimately
eliminate carbon emissions in furtherance of the public welfare during
a time of climate crisis. 24 To justify eminent domain, President Biden
should draw parallels that compare (1) the socioeconomic “blight” that
fossil fuel facilities impart on the communities situated around them,
with (2) similar policy concerns that have prompted use of Fifth
Amendment federal eminent domain powers in the past. 25
19.

20.
21.
22.

23.
24.
25.

See Milman, supra note 18; Sandra Rizzo & Jamie Lee, Bident Must Sustain Laser
Focus to Meet Lofty Green Goals, LAW360 (Nov. 25, 2020, 3:48 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1331805/biden-must-sustain-laser-focus-to-meetlofty-green-goals [https://perma.cc/YBD9-CN5S].
See, e.g., Aaron Eisenberg, Embracing Eminent Domain for the Sake of the Planet, THE
TROUBLE (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.the-trouble.com/content/2019/2/25/embracingeminent-domain-for-the-sake-of-the-planet [https://perma.cc/RJ4G-E3KL].
See discussion infra Section IV.A (discussing federal buybacks).
See discussion infra Section IV.B (discussing federal regulatory takings); see, e.g.,
Juliet Eilperin & Brady Dennis, Biden is Hiking the Cost of Carbon. It Will Change
How the U.S. Tackles Global Warming., WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2021, 8:11 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2021/02/26/biden-costclimate-change/ [https://perma.cc/Q5ZT-WP5N] (summarizing President Biden’s
plans to make government approval of fossil fuel projects more stringent by associating
higher cost projections with greenhouse gas emissions). See generally John H. Klock
& Peter H. Cook, The Condemning of America: Regulatory “Takings” and the
Purchase by the United States of America’s Wetlands, 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 330, 355
(1988).
See infra notes 81–88 and accompanying text.
See Eisenberg, supra note 20.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. President Biden should carefully study past federal eminent
domain efforts before embracing them again. See infra notes 33–39 and accompanying
text. Consider, for example, the federal urban renewal program, which was adopted to
revitalize neighborhoods in the 1950s. See Jon C. Teaford, Urban Renewal and Its
Aftermath, 11 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 443, 445–51 (2000). “Blight” is a term used to
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The Biden Plan does not specifically mention using buybacks,
regulatory takings, or eminent domain. 26 However, the federal
acquisition and repurposing of nonrenewable energy facilities would
unequivocally expand upon President Biden’s clean energy plans and
2050 emissions benchmark. 27 Likewise, sites acquired through federal
acquisitions could be directly transformed through sustainable
investments in alternative energy sources, green spaces, affordable
housing, public transit, and other infrastructural improvements to
further quality of life, particularly for vulnerable communities.28
President Biden’s administration should consider how voluntary
buybacks, regulatory takings, and eminent domain can inform the
primary goals of his climate plan and allow for rapid expansion of
renewable energy infrastructure.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND PRESIDENT BIDEN’S
ACTIONS TOWARD THE BIDEN PLAN
Since taking office, President Biden has made some progress toward
his 2050 emissions goal by placing a moratorium on new federal land
and water leases to the fossil fuel industry. 29 His administration has
also indicated plans to recalculate the “social cost of carbon”—the
figure used by the federal government to calculate how much
environmental and economic damage results from one ton of carbon—
to make it more difficult for nonrenewable energy projects to be
approved for land leases. 30 In addition, President Biden is establishing
a Civilian Climate Corps Initiative to expand the federal government’s
land protections and put tens of millions of people to work on

26.
27.

28.
29.

30.

describe infrastructural or economic decline. Historically, the federal response was to
acquire blighted properties and replace them with new neighborhoods and businesses.
See id. at 450.
See generally The Biden Plan, supra note 1.
Federal land acquisitions would constitute “[1] an enforcement mechanism [to achieve
100% clean energy] that includes milestone targets no later than the end of his first term
in 2025” and “[2] a historic investment in clean energy and climate research and
innovation.” See id.
These investments are discussed throughout The Biden Plan. See id.
See Maggie Astor, A Crucial Test Is Coming for Biden’s Climate Agenda, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/08/us/politics/biden-climateagenda.html [https://perma.cc/HPZ7-NZLA]; Bill McKibben, The Biden
Administration’s Landmark Day in the Fight for the Climate, NEW YORKER (Jan. 28,
2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-biden-administrationslandmark-day-in-the-fight-for-the-climate [https://perma.cc/C2QC-UQ4H].
See Eilperin & Dennis, supra note 22.
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environmental preservation and biodiversity projects. 31 President
Biden is also not acting alone—his climate change team includes
political experts who forcefully express support for federal
appropriations of lands and renewable energy development. 32 For
example, President Biden’s Special Presidential Envoy for Climate,
former Senator John Kerry, said that “if we build out a huge
infrastructure for gas now to continue to use it as the bridge fuel . . .
we’re going to be stuck with stranded assets in ten, twenty, thirty
years.” 33 Similarly, the Chairman of the U.S. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC), Rich Glick, has grappled with the
disproportionate impacts of fossil fuel projects on the poor
throughout his career, and he hopes to help President Biden
implement more clean energy projects like wind and solar farms. 34
Still, President Biden must consider how to respond to the litany of
obstacles that The Biden Plan does not explicitly address. Among
them, he must determine exactly how his administration will acquire
authority over enough land to achieve a 100% carbon-free economy by
2050.
If President Biden considers a federal acquisitions approach, he
should listen to concerns about the adverse consequences of federal
intervention, like those from Rich Glick, that highlight a critical need
for the President to learn from past federal efforts. 35 For example,
federal eminent domain is the most aggressive of the three proposed
approaches outlined in this comment because it would take property
directly from private entities in exchange for the government’s “just

31.

32.

33.
34.

35.

See The Biden Plan, supra note 1 (“Biden recognizes we must go further, faster and
more aggressively than ever before, by . . . [p]rotecting biodiversity, slowing extinction
rates and helping leverage natural climate solutions by conserving 30% of America’s
lands and waters by 2030.”); Maegan Vazquez & Kate Sullivan, Biden Aims for
Comprehensive Climate Approach as He Halts New Oil and Gas Leases on Federal
Land, CNN POL. (Jan. 27, 2021, 4:35 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/27/
politics/climate-executive-orders-joe-biden/index.html
[https://perma.cc/K5SSECS2]; Tik Root, 9 Questions About the Civilian Climate Corps, Answered, WASH.
POST,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-solutions/2021/09/16/civilianclimate-corps-explained/ [https://perma.cc/B6KG-ZNL9] (Sept. 16, 2021, 1:00 PM).
See Elizabeth Elkin, Who’s Who on Biden’s Sprawling Climate Team, BLOOMBERG:
BLOOMBERG
GREEN
(Jan.
27,
2021,
9:25
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-01-27/who-s-helping-joe-bidenfight-climate-change-a-bloomberg-green-guide [https://perma.cc/HH9F-R5LW].
McKibben, supra note 29; Elkin, supra note 32.
See Stephen Cunningham & Naureen S. Malik, Biden Pick for Energy Regulator to
Play Key Role in Green Shift, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 21, 2021, 11:32 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-21/ferc-s-rich-glick-says-he-sbeen-chosen-to-lead-energy-regulator [https://perma.cc/P5QD-NAS6].
See id.
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compensation.” 36 However, this approach to federal takings has often
backfired and created detrimental socioeconomic effects on the
populations intended to benefit from it. 37 The federal government has
used eminent domain in attempts to rectify urban blight and
infrastructural decline, but the term “blight” has often been construed
and applied to disproportionately impact Black communities or the
poor, while benefitting richer, whiter communities under the guise of
an inclusive solution. 38 When used to take homes and businesses,
eminent domain walks a precarious tightrope between beneficial
restoration and burdensome gentrification, which can easily displace
people in impacted communities. 39 Consequently, the success of
eminent domain in the climate context is contingent on President
Biden’s ability to both acquire fossil fuel facilities and efficiently
replace them with infrastructure that benefits the existing local
communities around them. 40 An emphasis on communication and
negotiation with communities would also be needed under a regulatory
takings approach because the phasing-out of fossil fuels would
similarly phase out jobs which may currently pay more than
renewable energy work. 41 Likewise, President Biden may negotiate
and purchase fossil fuel facilities under a more transactional,
buyback approach; however, the federal government would still need
to form collaborative relationships with local communities,
particularly southern and rural ones, which remain largely employed
by the fossil fuel industry. 42
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

42.

See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See, e.g., Sarah Fox, Environmental Gentrification, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 803, 821–23
(2019).
See id. at 817–25.
See id. at 826.
See id. at 842 (discussing how developers intending to engage in environmentally
harmful land uses will purchase the cheapest real estate, which corresponds with
communities of color).
See Josh Lederman, Green vs. Blue: Biden’s Climate Plans Face Labor Concerns, NBC
NEWS (Mar. 6, 2021, 6:12 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/greenvs-blue-biden-s-climate-plans-face-labor-concerns-n1259732
[https://perma.cc/3NWK-TP36] (“[A]s it stands, wind and solar jobs just don't pay as
well. A power plant operator, for example, makes an average of $79,400 per year . . .
compared to $46,900 for a solar installer and $56,700 for a wind turbine technician.”).
See Jennifer A. Dlouhy & Ari Natter, Biden Climate Plan Includes Oil-Lease Pause,
(Jan.
27,
2021,
1:23
PM),
Subsidy
Review,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com./news/articles/2021-01-27/biden-to-order-climatemeasures-including-oil-leasing-moratorium
[https://perma.cc/5NRB-TFE4]
(“‘Workers have been fed a false narrative’ that ‘dealing with climate is coming at their
expense,’ [John] Kerry said. Instead, he said, ‘there’s a lot of money to be made in the
creation of these new jobs in these new sectors.’”).
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It may prove challenging for President Biden to secure the public’s
trust. 43 The fossil fuel industry’s automatic response since his election
has been to proactively stockpile land leases and inhibit any transition
of these areas into new and alternative forms of energy. 44 Overall,
President Biden must appeal to communities that are dependent on
fossil fuel jobs, and he must make clear that federal acquisitions would
be intended to provide sustainable infrastructure, lucrative green job
creation, green space, and adaptive management for projected local
climate impacts. 45
Climate change, in itself, may already be persuading people to
internalize the importance of eliminating fossil fuel emissions. For
example, the 2021 severe winter snowstorms in Texas were but one
recent instance when climate change, induced by carbon pollution,
catalyzed dangerous weather extremes in the U.S. 46 Some southern
U.S. policymakers who previously championed the fossil fuel
industries in their states have become interested in alternative energy,
and more may become amenable as they personally witness the severe
costs and consequences of deferring action on clean energy policies. 47
But President Biden’s approach must be proactive, not reactive. While
he will more than likely continue to face persistent political
challengers to his climate change policies, the implementation of
buybacks, federal regulatory takings, eminent domain, or a
combination of all three, during his first term may offer swift, thorough
means to meet his ambitious goals for eliminating domestic carbon
emissions and may demonstrate to his skeptics that intensive federal
action on clean energy can be effective. 48 Furthermore, an acquisitions
43.

44.
45.
46.

47.
48.

See id.; Chitra Kumar, Rural Americans Are the Future of the Clean Energy Economy—
Policymakers Must Catch Up, HILL: CONG. BLOG (Mar. 1, 2021, 5:30 PM),
https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-environment/541121-rural-americansare-the-future-of-the-clean-energy [https://perma.cc/65EY-5PCX] (“Building a
broader base of support for climate mitigation and adaption won’t come easy, based on
what we’re seeing in Texas . . . .”).
See Dlouhy & Natter, supra note 42 (“Oil companies stockpiled leases and drilling
permits in advance of Biden’s election . . . .”).
See id.; Lederman, supra note 41.
Extreme climate impacts in the U.S. are not limited to Texas. See Andrew Freedman,
Deadly Texas Blackout Shows Our Vulnerability to Coming Climate Extremes, WASH.
POST (Feb. 22, 2021, 2:57 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2021/
02/22/texas-blackout-climate-change-resilience/ [https://perma.cc/CX4R-PM3B]; see
also Kumar, supra note 43; Scott Neuman & Vanessa Romo, As Texans Recover Power,
‘It’s Life Or Death’ for Many Bracing for More Frigid Temps, NPR (Feb. 18, 2021,
8:18 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-winter-storms-2021/2021/02/
18/968973671/its-life-and-death-texans-still-without-power-as-nation-faces-morewinter-storms [https://perma.cc/HB4H-DUD8].
See Kumar, supra note 43.
See Davenport & Friedman, supra note 4.
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approach could effectively undercut opposing arguments about the
benefits and feasibility of The Biden Plan because direct federal
intervention would demonstrate that President Biden’s plan is not
merely an abstraction, and that land is actively being repurposed for
renewable resources, sustainable infrastructure, and green job
creation. 49 Regardless of his strategy, President Biden cannot wait for
the clean energy bandwagon to finally arrive and must act with the
notion that anything short of complete, national decarbonization will
create more social, economic, and political costs than savings. 50
Part IV summarizes the viability and challenges of the government
buyback, federal regulatory takings, and federal eminent domain
approaches to land acquisitions.51
IV. VIABILITY OF THREE FEDERAL LAND ACQUISITIONS
APPROACHES
A. Viability of a National Energy Lease Buyback Approach
1.

Overview

A government buyback of lands being leased for nonrenewable
energy production would be a voluntary, market-based approach to
land acquisition. 52 Federal buybacks of private property are not new:
in 1968, Congress created the National Flood Insurance Program
(NFIP), which allows homeowners in floodplains to sell their
properties back to the federal government after a flood event if they
cannot sell to a private buyer. 53 Climate change increases the risks of
property inundation in low-lying areas, so the NFIP and other federal
buyback initiatives may become more popular to prevent economic
losses as coastline property values diminish. 54 Similarly, government
buybacks are often used as disaster relief tools rather than proactive
49.
50.
51.
52.

53.
54.

See The Biden Plan, supra note 1 (outlining these uses as goals for his clean energy
plan).
See Eilperin & Dennis, supra note 22.
See infra Part IV.
See Brian Prest, Policy Options for Oil and Gas Leasing Reform on Federal Lands and
Waters, RES. (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.resourcesmag.org/archives/policy-optionsoil-and-gas-leasing-reform-federal-lands-and-waters/ [https://perma.cc/6TXF-A4NN]
(“Another option is for the federal government to buy back existing leases, which would
circumvent the legal question [of ending federal leases] . . . .”).
See Katie Sinclair, Water, Water Everywhere, Communities on the Brink: Retreat as a
Climate Change Adaptation Strategy in the Face of Floods, Hurricanes, and Rising
Seas, 46 ECOLOGY L. Q. 259, 278–79 (2019).
Id. at 279; see also 20 Good Ideas for Promoting Climate Resilience, GEO. CLIMATE
CTR. (July
2014),
https://climateaccess.org/system/files/GCC_Resilience.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VT7K-53RU].

114

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

means for infrastructural and economic stimulus. 55 For example, the
federal government reactively addressed the 2008 economic collapse
through a buyback approach by purchasing $225 billion in mortgagebacked securities. 56 However, buyback programs have significant
potential as long-term policy solutions for critical sectors of the
economy, including housing, energy, and agriculture. 57 The fossil fuel
industry recently called for federal help as it reels from economic
losses due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but this current industry
downswing also portends a larger economic catastrophe from
continued reliance on carbon energy. 58 Actions taken now would help
to mitigate future crises before oil wells run dry, the U.S. becomes
dependent on foreign markets for alternative energy supplies, or it
becomes too late for any amount of carbon reduction to halt further
climate change. 59
2.

Existing Demand and Challenges for a Buyback Approach

A buyback program would be a market-based approach, which
requires willing sellers. 60 Thus, President Biden’s primary challenge
would be to convince the fossil fuel industry to negotiate a sale. His
prospects of reaching these amicable agreements are dubious,
considering that the industry purchased an abundance of oil and gas
leases to mitigate potential policy changes before President Biden took

55.

56.

57.
58.

59.

60.

See Robert W. Adler, Balancing Compassion and Risk in Climate Adaptation: U.S.
Water, Drought, and Agricultural Law, 64 FLA. L. REV. 201, 203 (2012) (“Even absent
climate change, disaster relief is often controversial if it encourages behavior that
increases long-term risk. For example, compensating property owners in flood- or
storm-prone regions may encourage construction in those areas, thus increasing societal
risk.”).
See Anna Lowrey, U.S. Completes Sale of Mortgage-Backed Securities, Earning $25
Billion, N.Y. TIMES (March 19, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/business/
us-completes-sale-of-mortgage-backed-securities.html
[https://perma.cc/GUF9QLYT].
See Adler, supra note 55, at 205.
See Sanjay Patnaik et al., How Biden and Congress Can Use COVID-Related Corporate
Stimulus to Boost Climate Resilience, BROOKINGS (Feb. 19, 2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-biden-and-congress-can-use-covid-relatedcorporate-stimulus-to-boost-climate-resilience/ [https://perma.cc/46CU-UMXQ].
See IPCC 2014, supra note 15, at 554; see also Peak Oil: What to Do When the Wells
Run Dry, FORBES (July 20, 2010, 2:12 PM), https://www.forbes.com/2010/07/20/peakoil-wells-run-dry-personal-finance.html [https://perma.cc/JSR6-YJK9] (describing the
importance of alternative energy resources in planning for oil depletion).
See Matthew Brown, US Drilling Approvals Increase Despite Biden Climate Pledge,
AP NEWS (July 12, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-business-scienceenvironment-and-nature-6ac8ff49970e4b052489678b40e3ba82
[https://perma.cc/E54D-JSNE].
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office. 61 Then again, some pronounced oil and gas lobbyists are
coming forward to endorse bold actions on climate change. 62 Most
recently, the American Petroleum Institute drafted its endorsement of
a higher carbon tax on fossil fuel costs. 63 This position by lobbyists is
substantially different from former President Trump’s provision of
billions of additional dollars to oil companies, in response to fossil fuel
industry profit losses in 2020. 64 Perhaps there is greater demand now
for a federal oil and gas lease buyback, as the fossil fuel industry
substantially increases consumer costs to combat dim industry profit
margins and the global supply chain continues to struggle. 65 Even if it
was previously unthinkable that energy leaseholders would give up
their land rights, the current “perfect storm” of unprecedented
economic consequences from the COVID-19 and climate crises could
put enough additional pressure on fossil fuel interests to consider
negotiations. 66 While a rapid and total sea change by the fossil fuel
industry in support of a national buyback is unlikely, support for some
environmentally-driven initiatives would have precedent: in the 1980s,
for example, the federal government issued many oil and gas leases
to corporate interests in Montana’s Badger-Two Medicine region, an

61.

62.
63.
64.

65.

66.

Fossil fuel companies are not the sole enemy of aggressive action toward clean energy;
President Biden’s administration has issued over 2,100 drilling approvals since taking
office, breaking the president’s promise to end new drilling on federally owned lands.
See Brown, supra note 60; Dlouhy & Natter, supra note 42.
See Steven Mufson, Top Oil and Gas Lobbying Group Close to Backing a Carbon Tax,
WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2021, 6:32 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climateenvironment/2021/03/02/api-climate-carbon-tax/ [https://perma.cc/6734-E9FB].
Id.
See Antonia Juhasz, Bailout: Billions of Dollars of Federal COVID-19 Relief Money
Flow
to
the
Oil
Industry,
SIERRA
CLUB
(Aug.
26,
2020),
https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/bailout-billions-dollars-federal-covid-19-reliefmoney-flow-oil-industry [https://perma.cc/AY5C-CYGU].
See Will Englund, Oil Companies’ Losses in 2020 Were Staggering. And That Was
Before the Government Focused on Climate Change., WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2020, 8:34
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/02/04/exxonmobil-oilcompany-losses/ [https://perma.cc/RWT6-JXN2]; see also Jim Robbins, On U.S.
Public Lands, Can Biden Undo What Trump Has Wrought?, YALE ENV’T 360 (Jan. 20,
2021), https://e360.yale.edu/features/on-u-s-public-lands-can-biden-undo-what-trumphas-wrought [https://perma.cc/F8KL-3VUJ] (“Oil leases on 550,000 acres were
auctioned off in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, fetching just $14.4 million, far
less than anticipated.”); see also High Natural Gas Prices Make This the Time to Build
Back Better - With Clean Electricity, FORBES (Nov. 15, 2021, 7:45 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/energyinnovation/2021/11/15/with-high-natural-gasprices-now-is-the-time-to-build-back-better/?sh=7b90c0003a07
[https://perma.cc/ARA8-N9K2].
See Englund, supra note 65.
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area rich with biodiversity and home to the Blackfeet Nation. 67 Over
time, many of the leaseholders voluntarily gave up their rights to the
land in the interests of environmental preservation and cultural value. 68
This outcome may be repeatable today, particularly because there is
substantially more data to support a correlation between carbon
consumption and environmental destruction than existed four decades
ago. 69
There is at least one source of funding for clean energy spending that
is explicitly stated in The Biden Plan: the federal government
procurement system, which allows the government to negotiate up to
$500 billion in contracts with commercial businesses every year. 70 If
the price of a buyback approach is calculated according to the
Department of the Interior’s cost of $1.50 to $2.00 per acre to purchase
federal leases, then the procurement system would theoretically provide
for a purchase of up to 250 billion acres of land for clean energy uses. 71
In addition, a federal energy lease buyback program would likely have
the support of environmentalist, non- governmental organizations
(NGOs), which have tried purchasing leases to prevent fossil fuel
projects for decades with their robust fundraising apparatuses. 72 NGOs
cannot ordinarily buy new oil and gas leases because of federal
restrictions and qualifications on who can purchase them. 73 However,
a collaborative effort between NGOs and the government could tap
into more resources for buying back existing leases. 74 Still, the federal
67.

68.
69.
70.
71.

72.

73.
74.

See Associated Press, Oil Companies Lock in Drilling, Challenging Biden on Climate
Change, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2021, 1:05 PM), https://www.latimes.com/worldnation/story/2021-01-11/oil-companies-lock-in-drilling-challenging-biden-on-climate
[https://perma.cc/DKS6-798Q]; In Victory for Blackfeet Nation, Appeals Court
Upholds Protection of Sacred Badger-Two Medicine, EARTHJUSTICE (June 16, 2020),
https://earthjustice.org/news/press/2020/badger-two-medicine-victory
[https://perma.cc/98RG-DDR8].
See Dlouhy & Natter, supra note 42.
See IPCC 2014, supra note 15.
See The Biden Plan, supra note 1; What is Government Procurement, GMP,
https://www.gmpgov.com/what-is-government-procurement/ [https://perma.cc/S27U7HWU] (last visited Feb. 28, 2021).
General Leasing: General Oil and Gas Leasing Instructions, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
INTERIOR: BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-andminerals/oil-and-gas/leasing/general-leasing [https://perma.cc/83XR-HP2J] (last
visited Aug. 12, 2021) (“Annual rental rates for both competitive and noncompetitive
leases are $1.50 per acre (or fraction thereof) in the first 5 years and $2.00 per acre each
year thereafter.”).
See Shawn Regan, Why Don’t Environmentalists Just Buy What They Want to Protect?,
PROP. & ENV’T RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.perc.org/2020/12/16/whydont-environmentalists-just-buy-what-they-want-to-protect/ [https://perma.cc/3EMTHDMG].
See General Leasing: General Oil and Gas Leasing Instructions, supra note 71.
See Regan, supra note 72.

2021]

Materializing Biden’s “Clean Energy Revolution”

117

government may need to magnify its purchasing amount substantially,
from its current $1.50 to $2.00 sale amount for federal leases, to entice
leaseholders into relinquishing their rights to profit from the land for the
duration of their ten-year lease. 75 Similarly, the legal precedent, that
might otherwise allow the federal government to determine market
value, is largely useless because voluntary buybacks are not bound to
the laws of “just compensation,” leaving the government at the mercy
of leaseholders to engage in productive, fair negotiations. 76
Assuming some energy leaseholders felt enough pressure to sell their
land, the federal government would still need to negotiate with
thousands more. Corporate stockpilers purchased nearly 5,000 permits
in 2020 alone and did so specifically to prevent the lands from being
preserved. 77 The price-tag for a national buyback of the necessary
magnitude to meet President Biden’s 2050 goal, assuming there is a
price at which leaseholders nationwide would be willing to sell, could
be staggering. 78 Even if all leaseholders were willing to sell, it would
be infeasible for President Biden’s administration to perform a
sweeping sale of all leases at once; even with enough money to buy
every existing lease, there would also need to be enough money to
transition the facilities into sources of clean energy. However,
President Biden’s strategy for a buyback program could involve the
gradual purchase of leases alongside a concurrent, gradual transition to
renewable energy. 79 A lengthier timeline for federal buybacks would
match The Biden Plan’s goal to invest “$1.7 trillion over the next ten
years, leveraging additional private sector and state and local
investments to total to more than $5 trillion,” and ultimately achieve
100% net-zero emissions by 2050. 80 If developed over ten years, a
buyback program would also align more closely with the rate of

75.
76.
77.
78.

79.

80.

See Robbins, supra note 65.
See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373–74 (1943) (providing an example
of “just compensation”); United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S.
266, 278–79, 281, 284 (1943).
See Associated Press, supra note 67.
See Regan, supra note 72. Even on a small scale and at the fixed rate set by the
government, it takes millions of dollars to buy leasing permits: “Nonprofit
organizations such as the Nature Conservancy do it all the time, raising millions of
dollars in donations to buy land or easements to protect important landscapes from
development.” Id.
By 2025, President Biden intends to have an enforcement mechanism in place to reach
a 100% carbon-free economy by 2050. If he adopted a land acquisitions program, it
could be developed leading up to 2025, then implemented from then until 2050, at the
latest. See The Biden Plan, supra note 1.
Id.
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progress in climate and energy research and technology, which is
another priority within The Biden Plan. 81
Overall, a federal buyback program has the necessary legal
foundation to begin immediately but may need at least a decade to
complete. 82 A ten-year plan is beneficial because it would allow the
federal government to develop infrastructure as technology improves,
but it would not be immediate and would cap the maximum amount of
acquirable land by the end of President Biden’s time in office.
Notwithstanding the timespan, a federal buyback approach would be an
ambitious proposal to achieve The Biden Plan and the monetary costs
could exceed its practicality in the immediate future. 83 But The Biden
Plan is, in itself, already an ambitious objective to achieve a series of
“Unprecedented Executive Actions” toward aggressive climate and
energy policies. 84 Thus a buyback approach, even if utilized alongside
other approaches or across a longer timeline, may provide President
Biden with the necessary leverage to immediately begin eliminating
the nation’s reliance on fossil fuels.
B. Viability of a Federal Regulatory Takings Approach
1.

Overview

Unlike a buyback approach, a federal regulatory takings approach
would not provide leaseholders with a choice about whether to give up
their land. 85 However, regulatory takings are also not the same as
taking land via eminent domain. 86 Whereas eminent domain allows the
government to physically take property for a public use, regulatory
takings are effectuated by legislation when the owner retains title but
the government’s action limits use of a property to such an extent that
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

86.

Id. (The Biden Plan aims to “[m]ake a historic investment in energy and climate
research and innovation, as well as clean and resilient infrastructure and
communities.”).
See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 60–82 and accompanying text.
See The Biden Plan, supra note 1 (introducing a “bold plan” to address climate change
and detailing a series of plans, actions, and policies designed to meet President Biden’s
goals).
See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014–19 (1992) (framing the
Supreme Court’s “takings” jurisprudence by describing the issue as whether or not the
owner of property subject to regulation must be compensated for the regulatory takings,
rather than whether or not said owner has a choice in the matter).
But see Andrea L. Peterson, The False Dichotomy Between Physical and Regulatory
Takings Analysis: A Critique of Tahoe-Sierra’s Distinction Between Physical and
Regulatory Takings, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 381, 381–441 (2007) (arguing that the Supreme
Court should treat physical and regulatory takings equally for the purpose of just
compensation to property owners).
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it is deemed equivalent to a taking. 87 Penn Central Transportation
Company v. City of New York provides the touchstone test for factspecific regulatory takings: the Court balances the economic impact on
a property owner against the character of the government action. 88
Since Penn Central, the Supreme Court has upheld its case-by-case
approach to quantifying the extent of regulatory impacts and has
maintained that regulatory takings which “interfere[] with distinct
investment-backed expectations” are nonetheless essential
government exercises in furtherance of the public good. 89
Federal regulatory takings are different from physical invasions
because regulatory takings do not require government compensation
in exchange. 90 The Supreme Court has consistently maintained that
“[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law[,]” and that the benefits of government
regulation outweigh most adverse economic effects on individual
property owners. 91 The Court’s concern is that the government would
be unable to afford substantial legislation if it was required to
compensate for every land-use regulation affecting property values. 92
Critics of the regulatory takings doctrine raise various objections,
including that the Constitution did not intend to give legislators the
power to regulate land use without restrictions; the doctrine is too
amorphous and open-ended to be consistently applied; federal
regulatory takings strip the states of their power to control property;
and regulatory takings discourage people from owning property for
fear that it will be regulated out of their hands. 93 Yet, the factuallyspecific nature of a regulatory takings analysis has allowed the
government to protect important natural resources and to further the
public good without the burden of compensation. 94 For example, the
87.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326
(2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015) (“In the decades
following [Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)], we have ‘generally eschewed’
any set formula for determining how far is too far, choosing instead to engage in
‘“essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.”’”).
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
Id.
See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at
124 (quoting id.).
See Peterson, supra note 86, at 388.
See J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine,
22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 90–117 (1995).
See Klock & Cook, supra note 22, at 332–39 (discussing cases in which government
regulation did not amount to a compensable “taking”).
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Supreme Court in Andrus v. Allard upheld the constitutionality of the
Eagle Protections and Migratory Bird Treaty Acts which prohibit the
commercial sale of any part of bald and golden eagles. 95 The Court
reasoned that the legislation is not akin to a total taking of property
when the legislation causes reductions to the commercial property
value of the animals. 96 The positive environmental effects of this
regulatory taking have been palpable. When Andrus was decided in
1979, bald eagles were on the verge of extinction. 97 In 2007, through
the combined impacts of legislation and environmental restoration,
bald eagles were removed from the list of Threatened and Endangered
Species. 98 There is no existing environmental regulatory takings case
to specifically answer the question of whether there can be regulations
that push fossil fuel extraction into obsolescence. Nonetheless, the
regulatory takings doctrine is flexible and could prove useful as a
creative means to effectuate new decarbonization legislation. 99
2.

Existing Demand and Challenges for a Regulatory Takings
Approach

From a legal standpoint, the Biden Administration does not have time
to waste and should avoid strategies that could be contested for years
in court. 100 Just as the laws at issue in Andrus restrict the commercial
sale of bald eagles, decarbonization legislation under a regulatory
takings approach could prohibit the use of land for the extraction,
procurement, and sale of fossil fuels. 101 However, the Supreme Court
normally applies principles of federal regulatory takings doctrine on a
case-by-case basis. 102 Thus, it may prove complicated to justify the
doctrine’s application to the entire energy sector, whose profit margins
95.
96.
97.

Andrus, 444 U.S. 51, 52–54, 67–68.
See id. at 66–68.
Traci Watson, Bald Eagles, Once Almost Extinct, Make Comeback, AM. EAGLE FOUND.
(June 27, 2007), https://www.eagles.org/bald-eagles-once-almost-extinct-makecomeback-2/ [https://perma.cc/222C-3UD4].
98. See History of Bald Eagle Decline, Protection and Recovery, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV.: MIDWEST EAGLES, https://www.fws.gov/midwest/eagle/history/index.html
[https://perma.cc/DKN3-JLY5] (May 5, 2020) (providing an overview of legislation
passed to protect and recover the bald eagle species).
99. But see Michael Stone, Fossil Fuels, Takings, and Rawlsian Justice, 13 WASH. U. JURIS.
REV. 147, 148, 160 (2020) (“The unpopularity of regulations leaves them vulnerable to
backsliding under an adverse administration or Congress, which retains the ability to
enact new legislation or repeal old legislation should it become inconvenient.”).
100. See IPCC 2014, supra note 15, at 14–25 (outlining a multitude of ways in which
“[i]ncreasing magnitudes of warming increase the likelihood of severe, pervasive, and
irreversible impacts” from climate change); Rizzo & Lee, supra note 19.
101. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 57–59 (1979).
102. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978).
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cascade to other sectors including agriculture, manufacturing,
transportation, and retail commerce. 103 At the same time, the Court’s
prudential concern for respecting the separation of powers also means
deferring to the federal government’s judgment when an expansion of
law falls within the powers of another branch. 104 For example,
authorization for sweeping decarbonization legislation may be
justified pursuant to the federal government’s enumerated Commerce
Clause and Taxing powers. 105 A constitutional argument in favor of
expanded authority, when placed in the context of the climate crisis
and the COVID-19 pandemic, would be akin to how Congress justified
new legislation during the New Deal Era as necessary to regulate
interstate commerce and market prices of goods during an economic
crisis. 106 Furthermore, the fossil fuel industry already appears
amenable to some regulatory takings; its apparent support for carbon
tax legislation would enable the federal government to phase carbon
energy out of use by making it too expensive to be practical. 107
A regulatory takings approach would allow President Biden to direct
money which would otherwise be spent purchasing land into
renewable energy projects and green job creation programs. 108 Since
the government is not required to provide compensation for regulatory
takings, the costs would only derive from the normal expenses of
promulgating legislation. 109 In addition, President Biden may employ
this strategy alongside other approaches that require the government

103. See The Biden Plan, supra note 1 (considering various impacts of a clean energy
transition on other economic sectors, including those mentioned above).
104. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 247 (James Madison) (1788).
105. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549–66 (2012). The Court
held for the government and allowed a mandate under the Affordable Care Act to
impose a tax on those who do not purchase insurance. Id. The mandate was permissible
in part because it was deemed similar to other taxes that have been imposed to influence
and encourage people toward certain forms of conduct. Id. See also United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 555 (1995) (providing that Congress can regulate acts with a
“substantial relation” to interstate commerce); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
121 (1941) (holding that Congress has the power to prohibit substandard labor practices
and unfair competition because they have a substantial effect on prices of goods in the
market).
106. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 114–15.
107. See Eilperin & Dennis, supra note 22 (“[T]he ‘social cost of carbon,’ could reach as
high as $125 per ton once the [Biden] administration conducts a more thorough
analysis.”).
108. See The Biden Plan, supra note 1 (“We can export our clean-energy technology across
the globe and create high-quality, middle-class jobs here at home.”).
109. See Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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to buy properties, thus allowing him to offset a percentage of the
costs. 110
For example, President Biden could narrow his regulatory takings to
eliminate a particular fossil fuel use, such as coal, and utilize a
buyback, an eminent domain approach, or both, to phase out oil and
natural gas. Whether regulatory takings are used alone or as a
complement to other approaches, they are a legislative channel that has
been used to implement important and successful environmental
legislation in the past and may enable President Biden to achieve his
2050 clean energy benchmark.
C. Viability of an Eminent Domain Approach
1.

Overview

The federal government has historically applied eminent domain to
construct public utilities, maintain national parks and environmental
areas, and preserve historic places. 111 Large-scale efforts have also
included decades of government buyback programs in the twentieth
century and a record of federal “slum clearance,” starting in the
1800s. 112 In the mid-1950s, the foundational eminent domain case of
Berman v. Parker defined the scope of eminent domain to takings for
“[p]ublic safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, [and] law and
order.” 113 The Supreme Court held that legislatures can, in the interest
of urban renewal and redevelopment, use eminent domain to acquire
non-blighted properties within an otherwise blighted area. 114 In 2005,
Kelo v. New London extended Berman by holding that takings for the
purpose of economic development constitute a public use and allow
for property transfers from one private party to another if the recipient
party uses the property to provide “public benefits.” 115
While eminent domain is meant to stimulate economic growth and
promote the public welfare, one of its greatest drawbacks is its
potential failure to achieve equity and protection for vulnerable
110. See generally Stone, supra note 99 (arguing that eminent domain is not only possible
to acquire fossil fuel deposits but would only require the government to compensate at
the value that the land would have if it were not used for fossil fuel procurement).
111. History of the Federal Use of Eminent Domain, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/enrd/history-federal-use-eminent-domain
[https://perma.cc/TPF3-E9A4] (May 15, 2015).
112. See Sinclair, supra note 53, at 296; Teaford, supra note 25, at 445–51. Much like federal
efforts aimed at rectifying “blight,” the targeting of eminent domain to “slums” has
disproportionately exploited and displaced low-income communities in favor of pricy
residential and commercial areas. See id. at 444.
113. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
114. Id. at 36.
115. Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005).
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communities. 116 Inherent in the use of eminent domain is the
possibility for governmental abuse of the law, to benefit private
individuals and burden marginalized populations. 117 For example, a
group of organizational petitioners filed an amicus brief in 2005
concerning the application of eminent domain in Kelo. 118 The brief
argued that economic development alone does not justify eminent
domain, as “[t]he history of eminent domain is rife with abuse
specifically targeting minority neighborhoods. Indeed, the
displacement of African- Americans and urban renewal projects were
so intertwined that ‘urban renewal’ was often referred to as ‘Negro
removal.’” 119 Even when eminent domain efforts are not purposely
designed to impose disparate impacts, their application can reflect
underlying systems of discrimination. 120 For example, Katie Sinclair’s
scholarship on the use of eminent domain in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina in 2005 indicates that Black and poor residents of New
Orleans’ Lower Ninth Ward were disparately impacted by the storm’s
damage to the city. 121 Furthermore, the federal restoration and retreat
programs implemented to prevent inundation were concentrated more
on affluent, whiter areas, and were slow to respond to the city’s
displaced Black residents, resulting in higher death tolls based on
race. 122
Federal emergency responses are not the only actions that make
apparent the disconnect between federal strategies for eminent domain
and the actual needs of impacted communities. Professor Sarah Fox
argues that efforts to solve longstanding environmental problems and
implement adaptive management in marginalized, low-income, and
non-white communities often produce the adverse effect of
gentrification. 123 Consequently, residents in impacted communities
may never benefit from revitalization efforts—such as the addition of
green spaces or affordable housing developments—because they are
forced out by increasing property values and projects targeted at
attracting new people, not the existing populations. 124 Likewise,
116. See Teaford, supra note 25, at 443–46.
117. See id. at 445.
118. Brief for NAACP, AARP, Hispanic Alliance of Atlantic County, Inc., Citizens in
Action, Cramer Hill Resident Association, Inc., and the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7-12, Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005) (No. 004–108).
119. Id. at 7.
120. See Sinclair, supra note 53, at 263–67.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See Fox, supra note 37, at 805–07.
124. Id.
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Eminent Domain and Environmental Justice: A New Standard of
Review in Discrimination Cases contextualizes the risks of eminent
domain within the modern environmental justice movement’s focus on
disproportionate concentrations of environmental hazards in
marginalized communities. 125 Professor Janet Thompson Jackson
takes a similar stance, and contends that the law of eminent domain
does not sufficiently involve social justice considerations to prevent
blight removal and economic development from being made at the
expense of poor people. 126 Jackson explains that “[t]aking from the
poor to give to the rich is not a new issue in environmental law, and
the environmental justice movement was founded in part to oppose this
trend,” where the burdens of a “public use” are felt most by people
who may not receive the benefits at all. 127
2.

Existing Demand and Challenges for an Eminent Domain
Approach

President Biden must prioritize the needs of impacted communities if
he chooses to utilize federal eminent domain in furtherance of his 2050
benchmark. 128 Eminent domain has commonly been used to acquire
blighted properties in urban, predominantly non-white and lowincome communities. 129 In the climate context, however, the catalysts
for those conditions are the nonrenewable, “dirty” energy facilities that
create the most substantial pollution and perpetuate socioeconomic
decline. 130 To that end, President Biden may declare a national climate
emergency that necessitates federal takings to eliminate carbon
pollution from fossil fuels. 131 While this raises concern among some
legal experts and politicians about the potential expansion of executive

125. See generally Catherine E. Beideman, Comment, Eminent Domain and Environmental
Justice: A New Standard of Review in Discrimination Cases, 34 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L.
REV. 273 (2007).
126. See Janet Thompson Jackson, What is Property? Property is Theft: The Lack of Social
Justice in U.S. Eminent Domain Law, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 63 (2010).
127. Beideman, supra note 125, at 274.
128. See supra notes 112–23 and accompanying text.
129. See Sinclair, supra note 53, at 295.
130. See Ryan Schleeter, New Research: Air Pollution from Fossil Fuels Costs the World $8
Billion Every Day, GREENPEACE (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/
news/new-research-air-pollution-from-fossil-fuels-costs-the-world-8-billion-everyday/ [https://perma.cc/D66P-DTAX].
131. See Marcella Burke, Ethan Davis & Cason Hewgley, The Power of a National Climate
Emergency
Declaration,
LAW360
(Feb.
11,
2021,
4:10
PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1354077 [https://perma.cc/Z764-6ZMM].
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power, 132 advocates view eminent domain as an immediate way to
deploy concrete action and stop treating status quo carbon emissions
like a sustainable business model. 133 Representative Alexandria
Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY), Representative Earl Blumenauer (D-OR), and
Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) are calling for the U.S. to declare a
climate emergency. 134 In response to former President Trump’s use of
eminent domain, Representative Ilhan Omar (D-MN) tweeted directly
at him, saying: “Our next President should declare a
#NationalEmergency on day 1 to address the existential threat to all
life on the planet posed by Climate Change.” 135 One journalistic thinkpiece from 2019 outlines the application of eminent domain to achieve
the goals of the Green New Deal Resolution (GND); it sets forth these
competing political pressures and concludes that eminent domain is a
palatable way to take control over unsustainable polluting
infrastructure without crossing a line of total industry
nationalization. 136
A climate crisis declaration need not be motivated solely by
environmental considerations. There are 147 oil refineries in the U.S.,
each with a surrounding population of thousands of people, including
young children who must breathe in polluted air and incur severe
adverse health effects like cancer and congenital disabilities.137
Considering the health effects of air pollution on the already-deadly
respiratory COVID-19 pandemic, President Biden may be uniquely
situated to appeal to people across the political spectrum through
an eminent domain plan that fulfills environmental and public health

132. See Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, Does Trump’s National Emergency Set a Problematic
Precedent for Conservatives?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb. 15, 2019, 1:00 PM),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/does-trumps-national-emergency-set-aproblematic-precedent-for-conservatives/ [https://perma.cc/N66K-KM6K].
133. See Eisenberg, supra note 20.
134. See Expressing the Sense of Congress that There Is a Climate Emergency Which
Demands a Massive-Scale Mobilization to Halt, Reverse, and Address its
Consequences and Causes, H.R. Con. Res. 52, 116th Cong. (2019); Emily Holden,
Sanders and Ocasio-Cortez Move to Declare Climate Crisis Official Emergency, THE
GUARDIAN (July 8, 2019, 3:57 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/
jul/08/climate-crisis-sanders-ocasio-cortez-emergency [https://perma.cc/4S92-K8XS].
135. Ilhan Omar (@IlhanMN), TWITTER (Feb. 15, 2019, 1:53 PM),
https://twitter.com/IlhanMN/status/1096482619246723074 [https://perma.cc/XP4KL2E3]; see also notes 137, 139–42 and accompanying text.
136. See Eisenberg, supra note 20.
137. Map Feature: Oil Refineries in the United States, EARTHJUSTICE,
https://earthjustice.org/features/147refineries [https://perma.cc/ARY8-68F4] (Oct. 21,
2014).
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needs alike. 138 Likewise, the economic effects of the pandemic on the
fossil fuel industry provide President Biden with leverage to gather
support for a clean energy economy. 139 Finally, eminent domain would
allow President Biden to distinguish himself from former President
Trump’s unfulfilled promises, to revive the fossil fuel industry, by
giving blue-collar workers a physical place to look for new job
prospects. 140
President Biden’s use of an eminent domain approach to secure
nonrenewable energy facilities would allow him to pursue legal
avenues like those used by previous administrations to further public
health, safety, and welfare. 141 The concept of federal intervention in
national emergencies is well-supported: for example, President George
W. Bush approved a $700 billion economic bailout for mortgagebacked securities during the 2008 financial crisis. 142 Most recently,
former President Trump’s actions have called into question the breadth
of Executive Branch discretion to declare a national crisis as a
justification for eminent domain. 143 Specifically, he used eminent
domain substantially to execute the “emergency” construction of a
wall at the southern U.S. border. 144 A November 2020 study by the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that former President
Trump’s administration acquired, or was working to acquire,
138. See Callum O’Reilly, COVID-19’s Impact on the Energy Sector, HYDROCARBON ENG’G
(Nov. 19, 2020, 9:30 AM), https://www.hydrocarbonengineering.com/cleanfuels/19112020/covid-19s-impact-on-the-energy-sector/
[https://perma.cc/2MHRLM5H]; Robert Rapier, Will Covid-19 Hasten the Demise of Fossil Fuels?, FORBES
(July 12, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2020/07/12/will-covid19-hasten-the-demise-of-fossil-fuels/ [https://perma.cc/X7MD-8FXU].
139. See supra notes 57–58, 64–65 and accompanying text (noting the fossil fuel industry
had major profit losses in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic).
140. See Taylor Kuykendall, U.S. Coal Jobs Down 24% from the Start of Trump
Administration to Latest Quarter, S&P GLOB. MKT. INTEL. (Nov. 20, 2020),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-newsheadlines/us-coal-jobs-down-24-from-the-start-of-trump-administration-to-latestquarter-61386963 [https://perma.cc/2FUN-J5NB]; Oliver Milman, Will Coalminers
Stand by Trump as Jobs Disappear?, THE GUARDIAN (Sep. 28, 2020, 10:06 AM),
https://www.ecowatch.com/trump-coal-miners-2020-election-2647844484.html
[https://perma.cc/6HSR-5UUQ].
141. See infra notes 142–46.
142. See Kimberly Amadeo, What Was the Bank Bailout Bill?, THE BALANCE (Oct. 26,
2020),
https://www.thebalance.com/what-was-the-bank-bailout-bill-3305675
[https://perma.cc/2SMJ-VYH5].
143. See Camilo Montoya-Galvez, New Report Details Trump Effort to Seize Thousands of
Acres of Private Land for Border Wall, CBS NEWS (Nov. 24, 2020, 7:15 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-border-wall-plans-private-land-seizure/
[https://perma.cc/4KRT-KWJ5].
144. Id.; Gerald S. Dickinson, Property Musings at the U.S.-Mexico Border, 33 MD. J. INT’L
L. 162, 162–82 (2018).
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approximately 5,275 acres of private land to build the wall through
“fee simple” acquisitions—i.e. eminent domain—as of July 2020. 145
Thus, President Biden’s use of eminent domain to address the climate
crisis would reflect a continuation of similar policies from Republican
predecessors aimed at disaster prevention and economic protection. 146
Federal eminent domain may risk overbreadth in the environmental
arena because the meaning of “public use” is not altogether clear with
respect to who should benefit from a taking, how they should benefit,
and to what extent. 147 Beyond the government’s use of eminent
domain to designate national parks and protected lands, there is no
clear-cut precedent for President Biden to engage in takings that further
environmental policies or amount to the total acquisition of an
industry. 148 There may also be a federalism question concerning
whether the federal government can use eminent domain to acquire
property originally allocated for use under state eminent domain
laws. 149 In Eminent Domain as Climate Policy, Professor Alexandra
B. Klass outlines how states provide eminent domain rights for fossil
fuel projects and argues that a transition to clean energy should happen
through eminent domain at the state level. 150 However, Professor Klass
goes on to say that there are no state-level clean energy laws that curb
the development of new projects, and this leaves open a potential
avenue for federal intervention or, if not total control, state and federal
collaboration. 151 While there is no federal eminent domain power to
build oil pipelines, there is clear federal power (under the Fifth
145. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-21-114, SOUTHWEST BORDER:
INFORMATION ON FEDERAL AGENCIES’ PROCESS FOR ACQUIRING PRIVATE LAND FOR
BARRIERS (2020).
146. Eisenberg, supra note 20.
On January 8, 2019, conservative blogger and radio host Erick
Erickson tweeted, “If the President declares a national emergency
and starts using eminent domain and reprogrammed dollars to build
a wall, it is only a matter of time before a progressive President
declares climate change a national emergency and uses eminent
domain to shutter coal plants, etc.” The tweet received over 10,000
favorites and over 2,400 retweets before it was deleted one week
later. One can only conjecture his reason for deleting it—maybe he
realized he was giving his opposition some ammunition.
See id.
147. See id.
148. See History of the Federal Use of Eminent Domain, supra note 111.
149. See Alexandra B. Klass, Eminent Domain Law as Climate Policy, 2020 WIS. L. REV.
49, 58–60 (2020).
150. Id. at 49, 51–52, 57–59, 72–77, 79–80.
151. Id. at 57–58.
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Amendment’s Takings Clause, Berman, and Kelo) to acquire property
that causes detrimental effects on the surrounding community, and
repurpose it in furtherance of a public use. 152 There may also be
authority for expansion of federal power under § 1222 of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005. 153 This law allows the Secretary of Energy to
authorize construction of new hydroelectric power facilities in any
state being served by the Southwestern or Western Area Power
Administrations, which provide electricity to a cumulative coverage
area of more than one million square miles. 154 Beyond hydroelectric
power, Klass says that Congress has the power to extend federal
eminent domain for energy and infrastructure projects in the national
interest, even where state law may pose a barrier. 155
Overall, a federal acquisition and repurposing of nonrenewable
energy facilities through eminent domain may allow President Biden
to “[e]nsur[e] that all U.S. government installations, buildings, and
facilities are more efficient and climate-ready,” and “harness[] the
purchasing power and supply chains to drive innovation.” 156 Rather
than relying on polluters to self-regulate, eminent domain may help
propel the United States toward President Biden’s 2050 benchmark by
providing a clear “enforcement mechanism” for net-zero emissions. 157
There is likely enumerated federal power to utilize eminent domain in
furtherance of The Biden Plan. 158 President Biden may also justify
eminent domain as an implied power of federal intervention, by
framing his plan as an action in times of crisis, similar to former
President Trump’s use of eminent domain to build a border wall under

152. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28 (1954); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,
484 (2005). The Fifth Amendment’s provision of takings “for public use” has often
been used for federal purposes of environmental restoration, providing a precedent for
its use in the climate context. See, e.g., History of the Federal Use of Eminent Domain,
supra note 111 (“Condemnation cases like that against the Gettysburg Railroad
Company exemplify another use for eminent domain: establishing parks and setting
aside open space for future generations, preserving places of historic interest and
remarkable natural beauty, and protecting environmentally sensitive areas.”).
153. See 42 U.S.C. § 16421(a) (2018).
154. Id. § 16421(a); see also Facts About WAPA, W. AREA POWER ADMIN.,
https://www.wapa.gov/newsroom/FactSheets/Pages/about.aspx
[https://perma.cc/TJ2D-6RR3] (Dec. 28, 2020) (discussing WAPA’s service area which
covers 1.3 million square miles with hydroelectric power and provides wholesale power
to consumers in 15 western states).
155. See Klass, supra note 149, at 59.
156. The Biden Plan, supra note 1.
157. Id.
158. See supra notes 111–15 and accompanying text.
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the rationale of national security. 159 Furthermore, President Biden
need not use eminent domain alone; he may choose to combine it with
buybacks, federal regulatory takings, or both, to meet his 2050
benchmark. 160
Eminent domain is the most aggressive approach to federal
acquisitions, and President Biden should carefully consider its
drawbacks with respect to environmental justice, equity, federalism,
and overall pushback from the fossil fuel industry. 161 President
Biden’s team understands that it is critical to prioritize
disproportionately impacted populations in environmental policies, and
The Biden Plan enumerates goals to reach that end. 162 Ultimately,
carbon pollution creates substantial detriments to quality of life, so a
careful eminent domain framework for eliminating this
environmentally and socioeconomically costly use may aid everyone,
including impacted communities for whom emissions present the
greatest risks. 163
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO URGE
FEDERAL LAND ACQUISITIONS
This Comment presented three potential routes for President Biden
to acquire nonrenewable, fossil fuel energy sites in furtherance of his
national decarbonization goals. 164 The Biden Plan is conducive to
incorporating federal land acquisition approaches into his 100% clean
energy economy framework. Moving forward, President Biden must
materialize his goals and address carbon pollution through
unambiguous federal actions that will persist beyond his time in office.
The three outlined approaches for federal acquisitions include a federal
buyback approach; 165 a federal regulatory takings approach; 166 and a
federal eminent domain approach. 167 Of the approaches, a buyback
159. See Eisenberg, supra note 20; see also Dickinson, supra note 144, at 171 (“Indeed, a
major national infrastructure project that extends thousands of miles will . . . surely
culminat[e] in the use of the federal eminent domain power if landowners refuse to
negotiate the sale of their land.”).
160. See supra notes 52–110 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 116–36, 147–55 and accompanying text.
162. President Biden must do more than promise to aid disproportionately impacted
communities. See The Biden Plan, supra note 1 (The plan enumerates––as a major
goal––the need to “[s]tand up to the abuse of power by polluters who disproportionately
harm communities of color and low-income communities.”).
163. See IPCC 2014, supra note 15, at 558.
164. See supra Part IV.
165. See discussion supra Section IV.A.
166. See discussion supra Section IV.B.
167. See discussion supra Section IV.C.
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would likely be costliest. 168 This approach allows the government to
freely negotiate with the fossil fuel industry. However, its success is
contingent on fossil fuel lessees agreeing to the government’s offers. 169
Alternatively, a regulatory takings approach would use established
legislative processes to achieve clean energy. 170 It may also save the
government money because it would not require the sale of energy
leases. However, President Biden’s administration could still face
exorbitant litigation fees and time spent defending against the fossil
fuel industry under this approach. 171 Finally, a federal eminent domain
approach may be justifiable as an act made pursuant to a national
climate emergency. 172 This approach is subject to the costs of “just
compensation” and market value, so it may provide a balance of
desirability and cost effectiveness. 173 However, President Biden would
face critics arguing that this is a heavy-handed approach and a
violation of state property rights. 174 All three approaches would
require extensive preparation to ensure that they do not encroach on
state or private property rights. But, President Biden may effectively
balance the political, social, and economic benefits and drawbacks of
each approach through a combination of the three.
Finally, the concept of fairness in the context of federal land
acquisitions is complicated. The federal government should argue in
favor of the public good, for which there is no obvious definition; the
fossil fuel industry will argue in favor of profit margins, and the states
will argue in favor of their sovereignty over land rights. Yet, fairness
and equity in the climate change context means promulgating policies
to devalue carbon emissions that damage peoples’ lives and
livelihoods. 175 Not everyone may be willing to engage in a clean energy
transition, even if it would ultimately benefit their quality of life.176
However, President Biden has three powerful tools at his disposal to
use independently or combined. As President Biden continues his
time in office, he must balance the competing considerations of his
administration, corporate interests, the American people, and the
environment, for all of whom an idleness toward clean energy would
be the greatest failure of all.
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